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ORDER WITHOUT JUDGES:
CUSTOMARY ADJUDICATION
JOSEPH BLOCHER†
ABSTRACT
Scholarship on custom and law has largely focused on the creation
and enforcement of informal rules, demonstrating and in some cases
endorsing the existence of “order without law.” But creating and
enforcing rules are only two of the three functions of governance,
corresponding roughly with what in other contexts are called the
legislative and executive branches. The third function—
adjudication—has not played such a prominent role in the scholarly
literature on informal governance. As one leading scholar puts it:
“Custom has no constitution or judges.” But if customs can be created
and enforced by nonstate actors, why should scholars assume that
formal (that is, noncustomary) courts are the only institutions that do
or should adjudicate those customs?
This Essay seeks to describe and emphasize the role of customary
adjudication, the third branch of customary governance. In doing so,
it has three main goals: first, to argue that customary governance can
be understood in terms of the same three functions familiar to
students of formal governance; second, to deliver a preliminary and
tentative account of the third of these branches; and finally, to suggest
that existing scholarship on custom and law has given comparatively
little attention to the functions and forms of customary adjudication.
If successful, those contributions should set the stage for future
descriptive and normative work.
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INTRODUCTION
Custom-and-law scholarship has traditionally explored two
1
major elements of informal governance: first, how custom arises, and
2
second, how custom is enforced. These elements are analogous to the
legislative and executive functions of formal government. Like laws,
3
custom and social norms arise and function as rules governing
individual action, though they are not promulgated by any official
body. This is the legislative element of customary governance. Like
laws, social norms also carry sanctions for violators, including
ostracism and snubs, though these penalties are not administered by
state officials. This is the executive element of customary governance.
These traditional accounts of custom and law have not given
nearly as much attention to the role of customary adjudication. As

1. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18–22 (2000) (describing a
“[s]ignaling” model of norms); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation
of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355–65 (1997) (describing an “Esteem Theory of Norm
Origin”).
2. Perhaps the most celebrated work on norm enforcement is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). Professor Ellickson’s
study of Shasta County found that local ranchers followed community norms because of the
threat of informal sanctions, such as “negative gossip” and forcible self-help. Id. at 57–59.
3. This Essay uses the terms custom and social norms interchangeably, along with the
concepts of customary and informal governance. Cf. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a
Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225,
1233 (1997) (“We used to say ‘customs’ when we were talking about norms; now the norm, of
course, is to say ‘norm.’”); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in
the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 809 (1998) (“‘No concept is invoked more by social
scientists in explanations of human behavior than norm.’ Nevertheless, a specific definition of
the concept is elusive.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting JAMES S. COLEMAN,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 242 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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one prominent scholar puts it: “Custom has no constitution or
4
judges.” Indeed, the existing literature focuses disproportionately on
the existence and content of norms as well as the sanctions that follow
5
from their violation, rather than on adjudicatory functions such as
the selection of applicable norms, resolution of disputed facts,
application of the selected norms to the facts, and recommendation of
sanctions—the things that courts do in a formal legal system. To the
degree that scholars have focused on adjudication, they have
generally asked whether formal adjudicators—judges, that is—should
6
take account of custom when deciding cases.
There is something oddly asymmetric, however, about treating
the informal system as capable of creating and enforcing norms, but
ignoring its role in resolving disputes over their application. If
informal governance is robust enough to perform the former two
functions, there is no prima facie reason why it should not also be able
7
to perform the third. But even as the custom-and-law literature has
8
quite properly encouraged scholars to be less “legal-centric,” it has
itself remained generally court-centric.
This asymmetry is problematic for many reasons. If the literature
is to be descriptively accurate, it must capture the adjudicatory
function, just as any basic account of American government must
acknowledge the role of the courts. And that accuracy is important
not only for its own sake, but because it enables better normative
analysis of the virtues and vices of customary governance—whether,
4. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1654 (1996); see also
SIMON ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 175
(1979) (“[I]t certainly seems to be the case that adjudicatory processes of settlement are largely
confined to societies with some form of centralized organization.”).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 1645–46 (“The subject of this Article is another form
of decentralized lawmaking: enacting custom. To illustrate, courts may determine fault and
liability for accidents by applying the norms of the community in which the accident occurred.”);
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1992) (“[I]n [tort] cases that arise out of a consensual
arrangement, negligence is often the appropriate standard for liability, and, where it is so,
custom should be regarded as conclusive evidence of due care in the absence of any contractual
stipulation to the contrary.”).
7. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4, 34 (1983) (“Courts and other official institutions are not the only settings in which
adjudication and related modes of disputing take place.”).
8. Barak Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Toward a Positive Theory
of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2330 n.4 (2004).
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for example, nonstate rule enforcement (i.e., social sanctions) should
be entitled to deference, but nonstate rule interpretation (i.e.,
customary adjudication), should not. Moreover, simply recognizing
customary adjudication should help identify and evaluate the
9
mechanisms by which custom is adjudicated—face-to-face, by tribal
10
11
chiefs, in the court of public opinion, and so on.
This Essay attempts to describe the functions and forms of
customary adjudication and suggests that they deserve more attention
in the scholarly literature on custom and law. Part I describes a threebranch model of customary governance and explains how the existing
literature on custom and law—primarily but not exclusively that
12
appearing in law journals —has provided rich normative accounts of
customary legislation and enforcement.
Part II begins to do the same for the third branch of customary
governance by enumerating some functions of customary
adjudication, including the identification of governing norms,
resolution of disputed facts, application of norms to facts, and
determination of sanctions. Customary adjudication may also perform

9. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 7, at 16 (“The most typical response to grievances, at
least to sizeable ones, is to make a claim to the ‘other party’—the merchant, the other driver or
his insurer, the ex-spouse who has not paid support, etc. . . . A large portion of disputes are
resolved by negotiation between the parties.”); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s
No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the
Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1814 (2008) (“Under comedians’
norms system, the initial step is also a form of negotiation. When a comedian believes that
another has taken his bit, often he will confront the alleged appropriator directly, face to face.”).
10. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Inventing Market Property: The Land Courts of Papua New
Guinea, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 759, 783 (1991) (“Social control within clans is accomplished
mostly by informal means such as gossip and ‘tit-for-tat.’ For deeper disagreements, there are
traditional mediators and judges, such as elders and bigmen. Unresolved disputes can lead to
violence, especially disputes between clans in the highlands or ethnic groups in squatter
camps.”).
11. See Kathryn Webb Bradley, Introduction, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2008)
(providing an overview of how intense public interest in high-profile cases and robust First
Amendment protection of the press may lead to media coverage that erodes the presumption of
innocence in the public mind and results in a “case [being] tried in the court of public opinion,
rather than in the courtroom,” with an accompanying “rush to judge, rather than to do justice”);
cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003)
(“Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs
protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of
society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of
conduct on those who dissent from them . . . . [That protection] is as indispensable to a good
condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism.”).
12. As noted below, legal anthropologists have focused more directly on the issue of
informal adjudication. See infra notes 128–135 and accompanying text.
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functions that are less characteristically adjudicatory, such as
clarifying custom, educating people about governing rules, and
spreading information about violators. The identity of the customary
adjudicators who perform these functions is important because, as the
custom-and-law literature has emphasized with regard to creation and
enforcement, the institutional dimension of customary governance is
13
crucial.
This is a preliminary and extremely tentative account, meant to
frame research questions rather than resolve them. The custom-andlaw scholarship has benefited enormously from careful sociological
14
15
study of how groups—ranchers, diamond merchants, and lobster
16
gangs are among the most famous examples, though by no means
the only ones—actually govern themselves through custom. But this
literature has yet to engage thoroughly with the role of customary
17
adjudication and adjudicators. This is of course a matter of relative,
18
not absolute, neglect, and there may be good reason for the
imbalance—perhaps customs must be bright-line rules to be
enforceable, and thus their violation will be so clear as to obviate the
need for adjudication. Or perhaps customary adjudication simply
19
does not exist, since disputes over custom destroy a system of
customary governance, which, after all, is based on social agreement.
Maybe disputes over custom inevitably end up in the formal courts
because no customary adjudicator has the necessary legitimacy to
pronounce on disputes, or the power to enforce its own judgments.

13. See Robert M. Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 910 (1979)
(“Dispute-resolution work begins with the premise that there are many techniques and
institutions for performing a single social function.”).
14. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 40–64 (examining the customary self-governance of
ranchers).
15. See Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage:
Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 395–409 (2006)
(examining customary self-governance in the context of diamond merchants).
16. See JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 71–83 (1988) (examining
customary self-governance in the context of lobster-gang territories).
17. I have done some preliminary investigation into two potentially interesting groups—
Key West’s wreckers and North Carolina’s tobacco auctioneers—but have yet to complete a
paper on either.
18. Scholars have paid extensive attention to the adjudication of custom in formal courts.
See sources cited supra note 6. My focus here is on adjudication of custom by customary
institutions.
19. Cf. E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE NUER 162 (1940) (“In a strict sense Nuer have no
law. There are conventional compensations for damage, adultery, loss of limb and so forth, but
there is no authority with power to adjudicate on such matters or to enforce a verdict.”).
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But these are all hypotheses, not conclusions. This Essay
attempts three steps toward testing them: first, it argues that
customary governance can be understood in terms of the three
familiar branches of formal governance familiar to students; second, it
delivers a preliminary and tentative account of the third of those
20
branches—customary adjudication; and third, it suggests that
custom-and-law scholarship has given comparatively little attention to
that branch. In doing so, this Essay attempts to illustrate an important
question, to show that the literature has not addressed it, and to take
some tentative steps in the direction of an answer.
I. THE TRADITIONAL TWO-BRANCH ACCOUNT OF
CUSTOMARY GOVERNANCE
Custom can be understood as a system of social order that
21
operates outside of the state; a system, as Professor Robert Ellickson
22
famously put it, of “order without law.” So conceived, custom is
essentially a form of government unto itself, one that creates,
enforces, and presumably adjudicates its own rules—the same three
major functions that formal governments perform. The law/custom
divide appears within each of these functions. With regard to
legislation—the creation of rules—customs and social norms are rules
that originate from decentralized social processes, whereas laws are
23
rules that originate from centralized state bodies. With regard to the
executive function, a rule enforced by informal social sanctions such
24
as gossip and escalating self-help is a social norm, whereas a rule
20. The classic discussion of the forms of adjudication remains Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365–72 (1978).
21. My description of custom here is intentionally hesitant, as giving authoritative
definition to custom is a task that has bedeviled scholars far better positioned than I. The
state/custom distinction tracks, albeit imprecisely, related distinctions between formal and
informal, planned and spontaneous, and rational-legal and charismatic authority. The
distinction is not likely to create bright lines because the boundaries of what counts as “the
state” are not capable of precise definition. See Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State
Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31, 37 (“Almost all governance combines public and private,
or governmental and non-governmental, aspects.”).
22. Professor Ellickson’s account of social control divided the subject into five categories:
“self-control,” “promise-enforced contracts,” “informal control,” “organization control,” and
“legal system.” ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 131 tbl.7.3. By “customary governance,” I mean
what Ellickson called informal control, or norms. Id. at 127, 131 tbl.7.3.
23. See id. at 127 (defining norms as “the rules that emanate . . . from social forces”).
24. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 81 (1999) (“Further, norms are distinct from legal
rules. While the violation of law is punished by state actors, the violation of norms is typically
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enforced by police action and a prison sentence is a legal rule. The
goal of this Part is to show that scholars of custom and law have
emphasized these rule-creating and rule-enforcing functions and
largely neglected the rule-interpreting, or judicial, function of custom.
A. A Tripartite Framework for Customary Governance
Before distinguishing rule creation and enforcement from rule
interpretation within custom and law, it may be useful to say more
about the three-function approach just described. As a conceptual
matter, treating customary governance as having three branches can
26
be illuminating. It imposes a familiar and fundamental analytical
structure that has proven useful not only for understanding American
27
government —whose three branches are of course divided by the
28
29
Constitution itself —but of other governments as well. Indeed, the

punished by private actors. Sanctions imposed on norm violators may include everything from
informal gossip and disdain to formal exclusion from the group governed by the norms.”
(citation omitted)); see also McAdams, supra note 1, at 340 (“Roughly speaking, by norms this
literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”).
The possibility of sanction might also differentiate norms from behavioral regularities.
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 8 (“What distinguishes social norms from other behavioral
regularities is that departure from them provokes sanctions . . . .”); Oliar & Sprigman, supra
note 9, at 1812 (“To be a norm rather than a mere behavioral regularity, the rule against
appropriation must be enforced; that is, violations must be punished.” (citation omitted)); Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying
California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1234 n.11 (2000) (“In this Article I define norms
as patterns of behavior that are widely adhered to by some group of individuals, at least in part
because of social pressures to conform to that norm. . . . Norms can be distinguished from other
forms of human behavior that are widely adhered to for reasons having nothing to do with social
pressures.”).
25. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (2000) (“[T]he ‘imperative theory of
law’ . . . asserts that a law is an obligation backed by a state sanction.”).
26. By dividing customary law into three “branches,” I do not mean to suggest that there
are rigid and easily identifiable lines between them, nor that the divisions are best understood in
formalist terms, only that the creation, enforcement, and adjudication of rules are important and
conceptually distinct functions of government.
27. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1487 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the doctrine of
separation of powers as “[t]he division of governmental authority into three branches of
government—legislative, executive, and judicial—each with specified duties on which neither of
the other branches can encroach”); CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR
AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 45 (2001)
(“The division of powers among three branches of government is perhaps the most fundamental
feature of American government.”).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I (establishing the executive branch); id. art. II (establishing the
legislative branch); id. art. III (establishing the judicial branch).
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three-branch approach has become such a familiar way of looking at
government that students of the American system might forget we are
employing it, like glasses a person forgets he is wearing. Refocusing
30
on the three “essentially different powers of government” makes it
possible to speak with more precision about the specific kinds of
governance performed by the formal and informal systems.
Disaggregating the branches of customary governance is
important not only for the conceptual clarity it offers but also because
of the analysis that disaggregation permits. Perhaps most importantly,
it enables exploration of particular customary functions, rather than
treating customary governance as an amorphous form of social
practice. Like a formal legal system, one of the functions of a
customary system is to create rules. Another function common to
both systems is the enforcement of those rules. And, as this Essay
argues, both systems must also settle disputes over what rules mean
and how they apply to a given situation. This is the adjudicatory
31
function, and it is often referred to as, but can be distinguished from,
the enforcement of custom. In the familiar three-function framework,
courts do not, strictly speaking, enforce law; rather, they determine
32
when it has been violated and prescribe sanctions. Executive branch

29. See, e.g., Fraser v. Pub. Serv. Staff Relations Bd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455, 469 (Can.)
(“There is in Canada a separation of powers among the three branches of government—the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary.”); B.N. Srikrishna, The Indian Legal System, 36
INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 242, 242 (2008) (“The Constitution of India has set up three branches of
the State: 1. the executive, 2. the judiciary, and 3. the legislature.”).
30. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (“The Constitution in
distributing the powers of government, creates three distinct and separate departments—the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. This separation is not merely a matter of convenience
or of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital, namely, to preclude a commingling
of these essentially different powers of government in the same hands.” (citation omitted)).
31. See, e.g., Michael Conant, The Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause and the Law
Merchant: Swift v. Tyson and the Unity of Commercial Law, 15 J. MAR. L. & COM. 153, 156
(1984) (“[D]iamond merchants have systematically rejected use of public courts and statecreated law to enforce contracts and police behavior.”); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial
Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005) (same); Eric A. Posner,
The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 158 & n.53 (1996) (same); Richman, supra note 15, at 384 (referring to
courts’ inability to enforce custom).
32. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 454 (1993) (“The Constitution balances the power of the three branches
of government—legislative, executive and judicial—by granting the legislative branch the power
to enact the laws, the executive branch the power to enforce the laws, and the courts the power
to interpret the laws.”).
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officials—police, federal marshals, and the like—are responsible for
enforcement. Along the same lines, customary adjudication
determines when custom has been violated and sometimes prescribes
informal sanctions.
This functionalist approach, in turn, permits an institutional
analysis—one that draws attention not only to what legal and
customary systems do but on who has power and responsibility for
33
doing so. Just as the rule-making, rule-enforcing, and ruleinterpreting functions vary, so too do the identities of the people or
institutions with responsibility for performing them. A norm may be
created by the community as a whole and enforced by a particular set
of individuals within it—the peers of the norm violator, for example.
Either of these groups, or a separate actor entirely, could determine
when the norm has been violated and what sanctions are appropriate.
Disaggregating the three branches of customary governance also
enables a more detailed and accurate view of how custom does or
should interact with the formal legal system. The simplified version of
custom as a single undifferentiated mass fails to capture the nuanced
ways in which the customary and formal legal systems interact. For
example, custom-and-law scholars often focus on the question of
34
whether courts should apply custom when deciding cases. But there
is no prima facie reason why courts are or should be the only point at
which the formal and customary systems interact, nor why formal
courts should be the only ones to adjudicate customary disputes.
If one believes enforcement to be an adjudicatory function, this Essay can simply be
read as arguing that some adjudicatory functions—those discussed in Part I.A—have been
undervalued in the literature.
33. This distinction between what and who tracks the functionalism-versus-formalism
debate in American constitutional law. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between
Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21
(1998) (“Formalism might be associated with bright-line rules that seek to place determinate,
readily enforceable limits on public actors. Functionalism, at least as an antipode, might be
associated with standards or balancing tests that seek to provide public actors with greater
flexibility.”); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (“The Supreme
Court has vacillated over the years between using a formalistic approach to separation-ofpowers issues grounded in the perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of
government . . . and a functional approach that stresses core function and relationship, and
permits a good deal of flexibility when these attributes are not threatened.” (citations omitted)).
34. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 4, at 1694 (“The theory developed in this Article argues
that the lawmaker’s role is to find community norms, apply the structural test, and enforce the
norms that pass the test.”); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1–2 (“Here the relevant question is this:
where the defendant has complied with an industry custom, is that an absolute defense against a
charge of negligence and, therefore, a finding of liability . . . ?”).
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Indeed, recognizing the three separate branches of formal and
customary governance illuminates a range of interesting possibilities
for interaction between the two systems, an approach more nuanced
and accurate than a binary choice between law or custom. Sometimes
courts apply custom when deciding cases—the equivalent of a formal
adjudicator interpreting informal law. The reverse may also be true,
for example when the informal “court of public opinion” finds
someone guilty of having violated a formal law, even when that
35
person was found innocent in a state-run court. In other cases,
private parties use informal sanctions to pressure one another into
following the law—the equivalent of the customary executive
36
enforcing formal law. Other combinations are not hard to imagine.
Professor Eric Feldman’s study of the Tsukiji Tuna Court in Japan
provides a nuanced example of a formal-informal mix-and-match.
The Tuna Court is a formalized dispute resolution system created by
37
38
the state, but it is staffed by industry experts rather than judges,
39
and its substantive rules seem to have originated as social norms.
B. Creating Custom
The bulk of the literature on custom and law focuses on the
important questions of how and why customs arise. Sometimes
implicitly, this literature also addresses the question of who has the
power to create customs—who, in other words, serves the legislative
function with regard to custom. These descriptive and explanatory
accounts are deeply intertwined with the normative question of

35. This point of contact is worth particular attention, if only because it suggests ways in
which those who create formal law may be unable to control its impact. My thanks to Curt
Bradley for emphasizing this point.
36. Cf. Richman, supra note 15, at 397 (“The [New York Diamond Dealers Club’s
(DDC’s)] system of arbitration and information exchange thus sets the stage for other familyand community-based institutions to enforce the industry’s executory contracts; if the DDC
announces the verdict, then these complementary institutions are the sheriffs that enforce it.”).
37. Eric A. Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish Market,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 354 (2006) (“The rules for handling disputes at Tsukiji are thus state law,
which is interpreted and imposed by a specialized public court.”).
38. Id. at 339.
39. Some of the Tuna Court’s operative rules are derived from customary sources. See id.
at 358 (“[T]he Tuna Court’s very existence likely depends on social norms. Although it is
difficult to verify, for instance, the principle that the risk of latent defects should be borne by
both buyers and sellers may have started as a market norm and been formalized as a legal rule
in the [Tokyo Metropolitan Government] ordinance. And norms that bear on trust and
reputation help to keep buyers and their disputes within the market’s dispute-resolution
mechanism.”).
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whether and to what degree custom should be entitled to deference
or support within the formal legal system.
The incubator of social norms—the customary legislature—is
40
generally thought to be the close-knit group. Professor Ellickson, for
example, argues that “members of a close-knit group develop and
maintain norms . . . [that] maximize the aggregate welfare” and that
“members of tight social groups will informally encourage each other
41
to engage in cooperative behavior.” Other scholars have focused on
somewhat broader patterns of social interaction, while still invoking
42
the close-knit group as an important creator of norms. Professor
Richard McAdams explains the creation of norms in terms of a
43
natural human preference for esteem; Professor Eric Posner builds
44
his theory on the value of signaling and cooperation.
These descriptive accounts of how and why particular customs
arise are closely connected with the normative question of whether
they should be entitled to special respect from the legal system itself.
Most legal scholars addressing the role of custom in the private-law
setting seem to answer the question affirmatively, with varying

40. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 177–78 (“The hypothesis predicts that welfaremaximizing norms emerge in close-knit settings . . . . This qualification is necessary because an
informal-control system may not be effective if the social conditions within a group do not
provide members with information about norms and violations and also the power and
enforcement opportunities needed to establish norms.”).
41. Id. at 167 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“In uncovering the various Shasta County
norms, I was struck that they seemed consistently utilitarian. Each appeared likely to enhance
the aggregate welfare of rural residents. This inductive observation, coupled with supportive
data from elsewhere, inspired the hypothesis that members of a close-knit group develop and
maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in
their workaday affairs with one another.”).
42. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence
of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 507–09, 561–67 (2003)
(arguing, inter alia, that in the file-sharing community, a norm of reciprocity explains why users
make their files available to others, and that this reciprocity norm was inculcated in other social
settings and carried over into the Internet).
43. McAdams, supra note 1, at 355–58 (“Under the right conditions, the desire for esteem
produces a norm. For some behavior X in some population of individuals, a norm may arise if
(1) there is a consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in X . . . ;
(2) there is some risk that others will detect whether one engages in X; and (3) the existence of
this consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the relevant population.” (footnote
omitted)).
44. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 18–27 (“The signaling theory suggests that any costly
action can be a signal, that is, a mechanism for establishing or preserving one’s reputation.”); id.
at 25 (“Rejecting or shunning another person is costly because one cuts off opportunities for
cooperative gains and risks retaliation. If others mimic the leader in order to avoid being labeled
bad types, a moral norm would emerge from the statistical norm.”).
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degrees of certainty and with a wide range of qualifications. Although
some norms might well maximize group welfare, they could do so at
cost to “social goals such as equality, corrective justice, or the
45
protection of fundamental individual liberties.” Indeed, norms can
46
47
48
be socially destructive, random, inefficient, or impose costs on
49
outsiders. Professor Lisa Bernstein, for example, has argued that
courts should be cautious when using custom to supplement written
50
agreements. Bernstein points out that lawsuits often signal the end
of a relationship, and the parties involved might not want the rules
51
they use in their day-to-day affairs to govern such disputes.
Separating desirable from undesirable norms is therefore one of
the major questions for custom-and-law scholarship. Professor Robert
Cooter suggests that formal courts do so by engaging in “structural
52
adjudication,” a practice of enforcing only those norms that arise as

45. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 169–70.
46. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1064–71 (1995) (presenting and
defending economic theories of discriminatory caste systems and concluding that
“[d]iscrimination exists because it is productive for its practitioners”); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2035 (1996) (“[C]hoices are a function of
norms for which individual agents are not responsible and which, on reflection, many or most
agents may not endorse.”).
47. Professor Posner’s theory, in fact, depends on some random variation in order to form
majorities. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 26 (demonstrating how hairstyle norms develop from
initial random distributions).
48. See McAdams, supra note 1, at 412 (“All kinds of judgments can produce a norm.
When the norm does not arise to solve a collective action problem, the norms are necessarily
inefficient because the costs incurred in obeying and enforcing such norms produce no social
benefit.”); see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 172–77 (“In sum, one can make no presumptions
about whether group norms are efficient and about whether a legal intervention will improve
behavior in close-knit groups.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 234 n.5 (“Dueling was widely seen as
ridiculous shortly before its demise, and was satirized. Clothing fashions seem ridiculous as soon
as they pass. Dysfunctional norms often make people feel ridiculous but helpless: for example,
wearing ties or high heels, or attending a party for someone everyone hates, or a celebration of
someone who has done nothing good, or receiving gifts that one does not want from people who
do not want to give them.” (citations omitted)).
49. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 169 (“[N]orms that add to the welfare of the members
of a certain group commonly impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to that group. Examples
are the norms of racial segregation in the Jim Crow era in the South, and norms of loyalty
among the Gypsies or the Mafia.”).
50. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (1996) (“This Article challenges
the idea that courts should seek to discover and apply immanent business norms in deciding
cases.”).
51. Id. at 1770.
52. Cooter, supra note 4, at 1677.
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a result of long-run relationships, have minimal externalities, and
53
when there is not another approach that is clearly superior. Norms
that meet this test will be welfare-maximizing, he argues, and judges
54
should therefore rely on them when deciding cases. This may well be
so, but the fact that formal courts play the lead role in Professor
Cooter’s account of structural adjudication further emphasizes the
degree to which the forms and functions of customary adjudication
have been minimized.
C. Enforcing Custom
No matter which account of norm creation one finds persuasive,
a second and equally crucial inquiry arises: How are norms to be
enforced? This is a difficult question because the state’s monopoly on
the legitimate use of force effectively deprives custom enforcers of
one of the most useful tools for forcing compliance. And yet scholars
have demonstrated that, in many cases, it is possible to create order
without law by using customary enforcement mechanisms—social and
reputational sanctions, for example—and customary enforcers such as
peers and business partners.
One approach, of course, would be to say that customary rules
are or should be enforced through state-backed sanctions. This is the
approach implicitly taken by those who argue that customary
practices should be treated as law and enforced by the state against
55
noncomplying parties. But the appeal to state power, as useful and
effective as it may be, is not truly a form of customary governance, or
at least not of customary enforcement. Relying on the police or other
formal law enforcers to ensure compliance with customary rules
means combining the customary rule-making function with the formal
rule-executing function.
State-backed sanctions, however, are not the only option when it
comes to enforcement of customary rules and obligations. One of the
central insights of the custom-and-law literature is that social

53. See id. at 1677–78 (describing three conditions—“long-run relations,” “no spill-overs,”
and “convexity”—under which “enforcement of social norms is fair by the norms of the
community to which they apply and efficient by the standards of economics”).
54. See id. at 1696 (“[A] common law court should find that a social norm is law if it
evolved from an appropriate incentive structure. An appropriate incentive structure is one in
which incentives for signaling by individuals align with the public good (long-run relations,
convexity, no spill-overs).”).
55. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6.
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sanctions such as gossip and exclusion can be, and often are, just as
57
effective in ensuring compliance with customary rules. For example,
a comedian who violates norms by retelling another comedian’s joke
may be subjected to loss of reputation and other social sanctions, such
58
as mockery or peers’ refusal to share billing. Such reputational
sanctions can be devastating for comedians, just as they can be for
59
merchants who rely on their own reputations. Other sanctions are
more direct. Ranchers who suffer repeated or egregious trespasses
from another’s cattle sometimes respond by injuring the offending
animals, thereby inflicting another type of extralegal, and perhaps
60
illegal, sanction.
Some aggrieved ranchers even resort to
61
interpersonal violence. And lest it be thought that ranchers are

56. See Rai, supra note 24, at 81 (“Sanctions imposed on norm violators may include
everything from informal gossip and disdain to formal exclusion from the group governed by the
norms.”).
57. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 282–83 (“[O]ne reason people are frequently
willing to ignore law is that they often possess more expeditious means for achieving order. For
example, neighbors in rural Shasta County are sufficiently close-knit to generate and enforce
informal norms to govern minor irritations such as cattle-trespass and boundary-fence
disputes.”); POSNER, supra note 1, at 19–20 (analyzing how reputation can affect a person’s
economic potential); MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION 23 (1987) (noting
that groups “can wield with great effectiveness a range of positive and negative sanctions,
including the sanctions of approval and disapproval”); Robert D. Cooter, Structural
Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 215, 223 (“Empirical studies of community life and business practice have often
concluded that informal sanctions are more important than the law in enforcing norms.”);
McAdams, supra note 1, at 355–56 (focusing on the intrinsic value of esteem).
58. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1815. For a demonstration, see Peteholloway,
Stewart Lee — Joe Pasquale Joke, YOUTUBE (Dec. 2, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=0YE9Kthyaco (excerpt from a Stewart Lee set, broadcast on Comedy Central’s
Edinburgh & Beyond in 2006).
59. See, e.g., Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne
Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1, 9–10 (1990) (noting that if traders are adequately informed of a
trader’s previous transgression, they will institute informal sanctions); Richman, supra note 15,
at 396–97 (“Merchants comply with the DDC arbitration board only to preserve good
reputations and protect the opportunity to engage in future diamond transactions.”).
60. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 58 (“Despite the criminality of the conduct . . . , I
learned the identity of two persons who had shot trespassing cattle. Another landowner told of
running the steer of an uncooperative neighbor into a fence.”).
61. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 679 (1986) (“[F]ear of physical retaliation is undoubtedly
one of the major incentives for order in rural Shasta County.”); see also Donald Black, Crime as
Social Control, in 2 TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 1, 7 (Donald Black
ed., 1984) (“Most conduct that a lawyer would label as assault may also be understood as selfhelp. In the vast majority of cases the people involved know one another, usually quite
intimately, and the physical attack arises in the context of a grievance or quarrel.”).
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uniquely prone to violent retribution, it is worth noting that
62
comedians have been known to punch those who steal punch lines.
Considering the conditions under which custom should be
expected to succeed helps illustrate the other important feature of
customary enforcement: the actors and institutions responsible for
imposing sanctions. These actors play the same role in customary
governance as police and other law-enforcement officials in the
formal system. In the examples above, customary enforcers are often
63
peers—other comedians, for example. Rural ranchers fear gossip
64
from neighbors. Tuna traders who are too litigious can be sanctioned
65
through loss of business.
This brief account of customary enforcement is meant to
illustrate the functions of the customary executive branch by
describing both its outputs and its institutions. That is, customary
governance has its own versions of the formal executive branch’s
sanctions—prison terms, fines, and the like—and sanctioners—lawenforcement officers from the president on down to the police.
II. THE UNDER-RECOGNIZED THIRD BRANCH: A PRELIMINARY
ACCOUNT OF CUSTOMARY ADJUDICATION
As the preceding Part demonstrates, the existing literature has
painted a rich picture of the relationship between custom and law.
But that picture places the legislative and executive functions
prominently in the foreground, with adjudication appearing only in
the background, if at all. This Part attempts to touch up the picture by
focusing directly, if briefly, on the functions of customary
adjudication.
A great deal of custom-and-law scholarship describes the norms
or customs of a particular (and generally very interesting)

62. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1820 (“[A]cts of violent or potentially violent
retribution enjoy considerable legitimacy within the comedic community. In some instances the
attackers appear to feel morally justified. Comedian George Lopez did not try to hide the fact
that he punched Carlos Mencia in a dispute over suspected joke stealing—rather he boasted
about it publicly on The Howard Stern Show.”).
63. See id. at 1817 (“A second retaliation option, often employed as an adjunct to shunning
and bad-mouthing, is for an aggrieved comedian (and sometimes that comedian’s friends and
allies) to refuse to appear on the same bill with a known joke thief.”).
64. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 57.
65. See Feldman, supra note 37, at 344 (“As one seller put it, ‘Why would I, as the
auctioneer, sell a fish to someone who I know might loudly complain if I could sell it to someone
else? It’s only natural.’”).
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67

68

69

community—ranchers, whalers, comedians, roller-derby girls,
70
71
72
jam bands, French chefs, and so on —and how each community’s
norms are, can be, or should be enforced in the event of a breach. But
these analyses assume that there is agreement about what norm
applies, what the facts are, and whether a breach has occurred,
assumptions rarely, if ever, made with regard to the formal legal
system. Indeed, determining whether a rule has been violated is
arguably the principal function of courts. The questions of who gets to
decide whether a rule has been breached and how that determination
is to be made are therefore crucial to understanding any system of
governance, whether formal or informal.
It is far beyond the scope of this Essay to define the essential
attributes of adjudication. Professor Lon Fuller, in his classic The
73
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, focuses on the role of judges in
an “institutional framework that is intended to assure to the
disputants an opportunity for the presentation of proofs and reasoned
74
arguments,” and argues that “[a]djudication is a process of decision
that grants to the affected party a form of participation that consists
75
in the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments.”
Others have defined adjudication as “the process by which final,

66. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 1–120.
67. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from
the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 89–90 (1989) (describing the customs and rules
that are used to resolve disputes over ownership of harvested whales).
68. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1809–31.
69. David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Emergent Intellectual Property Norms Governing
Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1108–31 (2012).
70. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us
About Persuading People To Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 691–718
(2006).
71. Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems:
The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 192–94 (2008).
72. See Richman, supra note 8, at 2334 (noting that the private-ordering literature
“contains genuinely interesting stories”). This Essay unfortunately lacks such a story. I hope to
provide one in future work.
73. Fuller, supra note 20.
74. Id. at 365.
75. Id. at 369; see also Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era,
113 YALE L.J. 27, 29 (2003) (“The traditional judicial role was characterized by two guiding
principles: Judges relied on the parties to frame disputes and on legal standards to help resolve
them.”); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 988 (1987) (“As Lon Fuller and
others have taught us, it is resolving disputes through reasoned and principled deliberation,
based on rules, that is at the heart of adjudication.”).
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authoritative decisions are rendered by a neutral third party who
76
enters the controversy without previous knowledge of the dispute.”
Customary adjudication is to formal adjudication what custom is
to law and what social sanctions are to formal sanctions. That is to
say, it is the nonstate equivalent of the third branch of government.
And like courts, customary adjudication can be understood in terms
of its functions as well as its form. Those functions vary widely, but
some are relatively common. The following representative functions
do not constitute a comprehensive list, nor are they strictly necessary
77
to all forms of adjudication.
First is factfinding. In formal systems, one essential role of courts
is the determination of disputed facts—whether a criminal defendant
possessed drugs, whether a defective product caused injury, and so
78
on. Customary adjudication must have a similar function to establish
a link between action, norm, and sanction. Professor Jeffrey
Rachlinski explains that fact clarification is often performed with the
79
help, intentional or not, of others. Because customary adjudicators
are generally members of the community in which the dispute arises,
they are often particularly well suited to this factfinding role. Judges
on the Tuna Court, for example, “are not members of the national
80
judiciary, nor do they have any legal training.” Rather, “they are
registered tuna auctioneers who work for the Tsukiji tuna brokers
81
(oroshi) in the specialized tuna and swordfish division.” Similarly,
tribunals in the cotton industry are composed of arbitrators selected

76. ALAN SCOTT RAU, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & SCOTT R. PEPPET, PROCESSES OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 21 (4th ed. 2006); see also William L.F.
Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 63, 69 (1974)
(“Conventionally we label as adjudication that process in which the third party is acknowledged
to have the power to stipulate an outcome of the dispute . . . .”).
77. Cf. Cover, supra note 13, at 911 (“A court not only resolves disputes, but also allocates
resources, confers legitimacy, administers other institutions, promulgates norms, allocates costs,
and records statistics, to mention but a few of its more commonly recognized functions.”
(citations omitted)).
78. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law
Is Law, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2465 (2010) (“[I]t seems to be socially necessary to make
certain claims of fact binding as a matter of law . . . . This establishing is what it means for a
court to ‘find’ facts, and it is among courts’ most characteristic and essential functions.”).
79. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1554
(2000) (discussing how group settings affect individuals’ interpretations of factual situations).
80. Feldman, supra note 37, at 339.
81. Id.; see also id. at 339 n.69 (“Although the ordinance allows buyers to serve as judges, it
seems that the time commitment makes this unattractive, and no buyers are currently involved
in adjudicating cases.”).
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by industry associations. This relevant expertise presumably
improves their ability to understand and find relevant facts.
Second is identifying the relevant custom. Customary
adjudicators must be able to identify the content of norms and
determine which of many possible norms governs a given situation.
As Professor Rachlinski points out, “social norms are always in
tension with each other, which makes predictions as to which norm
83
will dictate social behavior invariably unstable.” For example, it may
be customary for the head of a household to sit at the head of a table
but also customary for an honored guest to do so. At any dinner with
such a guest in attendance, a determination must be made as to which
norm will govern. Customary adjudication must therefore include a
84
determination of the proper governing norm.
Third is applying the norm to the facts—that is, making
conclusions of custom. Though norms are often extremely clear-cut,
leading to a relatively simple application, it is not hard to imagine
situations in which a resolution could go either way. Say, for example,
that a comedian tells a joke that another comedian already told in
public. He does so inadvertently, however, not realizing that he was
effectively retelling another person’s joke. Is that a violation of the
industry norms against joke stealing? (The answer, it seems, may be
85
yes; joke retelling is apparently a strict-liability offense. )
86
Fourth is determining an appropriate sanction. Just as formal
courts hand down judgments saying more than just “Party A is right,”
sometimes customary adjudicators not only declare who prevails, but
also what remedy is appropriate. It is at this stage that formal and
customary adjudication begin to diverge most sharply, in part because
the menu of sanctions available in customary governance is, as
explained in Part I.C, different than in a formal system. Additionally,
82. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1728 (2001).
83. Rachlinski, supra note 79, at 1541.
84. This determination is particularly complicated in cases in which custom conflicts with
formal law.
85. Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1816 (“Here is how the well-known comedian Robin
Williams, who has faced long-standing allegations of joke stealing, describes the experience:
‘Yeah, I hung out in clubs eight hours a night, improvising with people, playing with them, doing
routines. And I heard some lines once in a while and I used some lines on talk shows
accidentally. That’s what got me that reputation and that’s why I’m f***ing fed up with it.’”
(quoting Playboy Interview: Robin Williams, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1 1992, at 57, 62)).
86. This is not necessarily the same as imposing a sanction. See supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
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customary adjudication may place a higher premium on reconciling
87
88
the parties and performing mediation than on identifying breaches
or determining damages.
More importantly, adjudication and enforcement are closely
related—perhaps inseparable—in the context of custom. The judicial
and executive functions blend in customary governance because
public adjudication spreads information, and the spreading of
information can amount to enforcement through reputational
89
sanctions. The announcement of an adverse judgment is itself a
sanction, precisely because of its impact on reputation. This was the
case, for example, with the medieval law merchant. Enforcement of
90
official judgments was extremely difficult, but the law merchant
could keep account of those merchants who defaulted. The
dissemination of this information created strong compliance
incentives because merchants needed to protect their reputations as
business partners. In their landmark study of the law merchant,
Professors Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast
conclude that “the role of the judges in the system, far from being
substitutes for the reputation mechanism, is to make the reputation
91
system more effective as a means of promoting honest trade.”
87. See, e.g., LUCY MAIR, AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 149 (2d ed.
1972) (“[T]he decisions of the courts [of some African societies] were concerned as much with
reconciling the parties as with awarding damages or punishing offenses.”).
88. See, e.g., P.H. GULLIVER, SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY 299 (1963)
(“The solution of a dispute between Arusha does not come from authoritative decision, but
through agreement resulting from discussion and negotiation between the parties which are in
conflict.”); ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 26 (“In stateless societies, . . . third parties are typically
limited to acting as go-betweens, transmitting messages from one disputant to another, or as
mediators, actively coaxing the parties towards a settlement, but still without the power to
resolve the matter by decision.”); Audrey Butt, The Shaman’s Legal Role, 16 REVISTA DO
MUSEU PAULISTA 151, 158 (1965) (describing the function of séances conducted by shamans in
the Guiana Highlands as “provid[ing] an occasion for bringing disputes and malpractices into
the open: if a culprit does not openly argue his case or make his excuses, the séance at least
informs him that his various activities are under public scrutiny and he is given the chance of
setting wrongs to rights”).
89. Cf. Milgrom et al., supra note 59, at 10 (“The institution that we model as the
resolution of these problems is based on the presence of a specialized actor—a ‘judge’ or ‘law
merchant’ (LM) who serves both as a repository of information and as an adjudicator of
disputes.”). Of course, a judgment of guilt in a formal adjudicatory proceeding will often lead to
reputational sanctions as well.
90. See id. at 2 (“While hearings were held to resolve disputes under the code, the judges
had only limited powers to enforce judgments against merchants from distant places.”).
91. Id. at 3. This conclusion has been analyzed and criticized from many angles. See, e.g.,
Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1156–58
(2012) (arguing that medieval law merchants did not create universal customs but instead relied
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Professors Ellickson and McAdams similarly conclude that gossip
networks can enforce norms when knowledge of a violation moves
92
freely.
Fifth is educating the members of the community. The educative
function of adjudication is important not only because it spreads
knowledge about who has violated rules but also, as Professor
Bernstein points out, because it educates “members of the trade
about the content of the rules and the contours of proper business
93
practices.” Customary authorities can therefore help clarify,
reaffirm, or elucidate customary rules, in much the same way that
courts “explicate and give force to the values embodied in
94
authoritative texts such as the Constitution.” Indeed, the social
sanctioning of a norm violator reaffirms not only the content of the
norm but also the obligation of the community to uphold and enforce
it. As Professor McAdams explains, “[t]he primary consensus that
behavior X merits disapproval is therefore likely to lead to a
secondary consensus that those who expressly approve, or fail to
95
disapprove, of the perpetrators of X merit disapproval.”

on local laws in resolving disputes); Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern
Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 685, 699 (2006)
(“[C]oercive power—to enforce decisions, to collect damages, and to assess fines—was
exercised routinely [in thirteenth-century St. Ives].”).
92. ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 180–81; see also Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms,
Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2251 (1996) (proposing a two-stage model for
development of norms, in which “[i]n the first stage, some group members internalize the norm
and are willing to bear costs to enforce it,” and “[i]n the second stage, their public norm
enforcement causes other members to internalize the norm”).
93. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy:
A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 773–74 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, Questionable
Empirical Basis]. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 124 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Opting Out] (“An important feature of the arbitration system [for diamond merchants] is the
secrecy of the proceedings.”); id. at 127 (“The absence of explicit findings of fact and written
opinions is a precaution to prevent people from complaining, rightly or wrongly, that the
arbitrators were biased, unfair, or relied on evidence that lacked probative value.”); McAdams,
supra note 92, at 2251 (“Even for adults, public enforcement may be crucial for inculcating new
members with group values.”).
94. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984); cf. Neil S. Siegel,
The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963 (2008) (suggesting that judicial
statesmanship “charges judges with approaching cases so as to facilitate the capacity of the legal
system to legitimate itself by accomplishing two paradoxically related preconditions and
purposes of law: expressing social values as social circumstances change and sustaining social
solidarity amidst reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement”).
95. McAdams, supra note 1, at 372.
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Together, these pressures can contribute to the internalization of
96
norms, which is crucial to the success of the system as a whole. They
are also a very important mechanism for the development and
revision of custom, for as Professor Cooter points out, “[u]nlike law,
custom lacks secondary rules. Custom does not prescribe procedures
97
for making, revising, or repealing itself.” As a result, customary
adjudication might well play an even more important role in the
development of custom than court decisions do in the development of
the common law.
Because these functions seem straightforward and intuitive, it
might be surprising that custom-and-law scholarship has not
addressed them in much detail. Some may protest that the literature
does do so. Of course, proving a negative is always a difficult
proposition, and it is not my goal here to demonstrate that no scholar
has previously addressed the issue. But as the following discussion
attempts to show, the traditional treatment of dispute resolution in
custom largely fails to address the adjudicatory functions laid out
above. Some scholars have effectively ignored the existence of
disputes about which, if any, norm governs a given conflict. Others
have focused predominately or exclusively on adjudication in formal
courts. Yet others have given attention to semiformal organizational
courts such as arbitration panels. None of these approaches offers a
full account of customary adjudication.
First, much custom-and-law scholarship downplays the point at
which disputes arise, jumping straight from the creation of a norm to
98
its enforcement. Professor Ellickson’s canonical Order Without Law,
for example, purports to address “how residents of rural Shasta
99
County, California, resolve a variety of disputes.” But the actual
resolution of these disputes in an adjudicatory sense—the
determination of what social norm governs and how it applies, for
example—is mostly sidelined. As Professor Lewis Kornhauser
pointed out in his review of the book:

96. See Cooter, supra note 4, at 1665 (“[A] social norm is ineffective in a community and
does not exist unless people internalize it.”).
97. Id. at 1654. From this, Professor Cooter concludes that “[c]ustom has no constitution or
judges. A person who wants to change custom must use whatever means are at hand to convince
others to follow different norms.” Id. I obviously disagree with the first of these statements, at
least to the degree that it would minimize the importance of the adjudicatory function described
here.
98. ELLICKSON, supra note 2.
99. Id. at 1.
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Ellickson uses the term “dispute.” However, I have placed
“dispute” in quotes because these transactions display little
disagreement either over the facts or over the relevant norms
governing these facts. When X delivers a gross of widgets to Y with
payment expected in 30 days, we do not think that Y’s prompt
payment constitutes a dispute. Nor do we necessarily view X and Y
as disputing if, after Y returns the delivery as non-conforming to the
100
contract specifications, X delivers a conforming gross.

Other scholarship in the Ellicksonian tradition similarly addresses
101
situations in which customary rules are clear, and disputes over the
existence of a violation correspondingly rare. Whalers adhered to a
102
rigid fast-fish rule that clearly indicated possession of an animal.
103
Comedians give precedence to the first to perform a joke. In roller
derby, a Master Roster of pseudonyms decides which skater gets to
104
use a contested name based on who registered it first. And for jam
bands, the question is simply whether or not the band has green105
lighted the duplication of a particular work. In each of these cases,
and most of the other scholarly examples, the potential for a real
dispute is limited, because the rules are exceedingly clear.
Second, to the degree that scholars have addressed the
adjudication of customary disputes, they have tended to assume that
such adjudication does or should take place in formal, statesanctioned courts. Indeed, perhaps the central concern of most
custom-and-law scholarship has been to identify situations in which
such courts should resolve disputes using customary rules. Even those
case studies that seem to explore informal courts actually tend to
address state-backed courts. Professor Feldman’s study of the Tsukiji

100. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 649 n.9 (1992) (reviewing ELLICKSON, supra note 2).
101. As discussed, there may be good reasons why custom is generally clear. See supra text
accompanying notes 18–19.
102. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 197–98 (“Prior to 1800, the British whalers operating
in the Greenland fishery established the norm that a claimant owned a whale, dead or alive, so
long as the whale was fast—that is, physically connected by line or other device to the claimant’s
boat or ship.”); see also Ellickson, supra note 67, at 89–90 (same).
103. See Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 1826 (explaining that the first comedian to
perform a joke becomes the exclusive owner of that joke).
104. See Fagundes, supra note 69, at 1121 (“If a proposed name is identical to an existing
registered one, another skater cannot use that proposed name.”).
105. See Schultz, supra note 70, at 681 (explaining that many bands do not allow their songs
to be copied without permission).
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Tuna Court fits this model. Professor Cooter’s study of the land
courts of Papua New Guinea does, too. As Cooter notes, “[t]he very
existence of [Papua New Guinea’s] land courts represents a departure
from customary dispute resolution,” which was traditionally done by
107
appealing to village elders and bigmen. Even as custom-and-law
108
scholarship has become less “legal-centric,” it has remained largely
court-centric.
Another variation in the literature addresses what might be
called “organizational” adjudication. Professor Bernstein’s work is
exemplary in this regard. Her studies have shed light on extralegal
109
dispute resolution within groups such as diamond dealers, grain
110
111
traders, and cotton merchants. In Professor Bernstein’s work,
112
disputes are real, meaty, and complex. Professor Barak Richman,
113
too, has described the Jewish diamond dealers’ arbitration system
and studied how “Jewish community institutions serve as unusually
effective enforcement mechanisms and thus create a comparative
114
advantage for Jewish merchants.”
These institutions include
115
intricate arbitration systems. Inasmuch as these tribunals exist apart
116
from the state itself, Professor Bernstein is “challeng[ing] the idea
106. See Feldman, supra note 37, at 354 (noting that many of the rules governing the Tsukiji
Tuna Court are state laws).
107. Cooter, supra note 10, at 783.
108. Cf. Richman, supra note 8, at 2330 n.4 (discussing criticisms of legal centrism).
109. See Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 93 (“[S]ophisticated traders who dominate the
[diamond] industry have developed an elaborate, internal set of rules, complete with distinctive
institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes among industry members. This article explores the
reasons that this system of private governance has developed and endured within the diamond
trade.”).
110. See Bernstein, supra note 50 (“[This Article] presents a case study of the private legal
system created by the National Grain and Feed Association (‘NGFA’) to resolve contract
disputes among its members.”).
111. See Bernstein, supra note 82 (describing cotton-merchant associations’ disputeresolution systems).
112. One example of this complexity is determining the quality of cotton. See, e.g., id. at
1773–74 (“Even in the absence of opportunism, two cotton transactors, each acting in good
faith, might well disagree about how to grade a particular shipment, and each might therefore
conclude that the other has defected.”).
113. Richman, supra note 15, at 395–98.
114. Id. at 389.
115. See Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1771–74 (describing the grain traders’ arbitration
system); Bernstein, supra note 82, at 1727–31 (describing the cotton merchants’ arbitration
system); Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 93, at 124–25 (describing the diamond dealers’
arbitration system).
116. As Professor Richman notes, the Memphis Cotton Exchange and the New York DDC
“generally invite state courts to enforce their rulings,” but “very few private disputes spill into
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that courts should seek to discover and apply immanent business
117
norms in deciding cases” —thus avoiding the court-centric focus that
characterizes much of the custom-and-law literature. Professor
Richman, meanwhile, is primarily interested in the enforcement of
118
contracts, not the adjudicatory functions discussed in this Essay.
And yet the kinds of organizational adjudication Professors
Bernstein and Richman have explored do not capture the full range
of customary adjudication. Most are centralized dispute-resolution
tribunals, and the procedural rules they follow are not traditional
119
social norms but formal codes crafted by the organization. They
represent what Professor Richman calls “organized” rather than
120
“spontaneous” private ordering. And as he points out, “[n]ot all
121
systems of private law have private judges or arbitrators.” Thus
although industry arbitration boards are “informal” in the sense of
being nonstate, they are as different from customary adjudication as
122
organizational rules are from custom.
Other scholars mention customary dispute resolution but do not
address it in much depth. Medieval Iceland, for example, has been the
focus of a relatively rich literature on informal governance,

state courts and are instead enforced exclusively through the threat of private, extralegal
sanctions.” Richman, supra note 8, at 2339 n.32.
117. Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1768 (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 15, at 389, 392 (discussing the challenges of enforcing
diamond-executor contracts).
119. See Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1777–78 (“The NGFA tribunal does not permit
unwritten customs and usages of trade to vary or qualify the meaning of either trade rules or
explicit contractual provisions. Arbitrators use custom to decide cases only when both the trade
rules and the contract are silent. Yet even when looking to custom to fill a true contractual gap,
the arbitrators often signal their distaste for this type of adjudication . . . .”); Bernstein, supra
note 82, at 1731–32 (“The [Board of Appeals] decides contract disputes by applying the
[Southern Mill Rules], a comprehensive set of bright-line contract default rules that cover
contract formation, performance, quality, delay, payment, repudiation, excuse, and damages,
and include numerous industry-specific definitions of terms . . . .”). The diamond dealers may
use some custom to decide disputes, but they also rely on trade rules set out in bylaws.
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 93, at 126.
120. Richman, supra note 8, at 2339 n.33.
121. Id.; see also McAdams, supra note 1, at 351 (“[S]ome theorists prefer to use the term
norms to refer only to decentralized rules and regard organizational rules as a set of obligations
falling between centralized law and decentralized norms.”).
122. See ELLICKSON, supra note 2, at 127 (distinguishing between norms and organizational
rules); David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual Relationships,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841, 1842 (1996) (distinguishing between centralized and decentralized
norms).
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123

including—albeit usually in passing—adjudication. Icelandic society
was governed through a combination of local assemblies, called
“Things,” and annual national assemblies, called “Allthings.” Both
Things and Allthings functioned as courts, with the latter effectively
having diversity jurisdiction over cases from different localities and
appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by Things. Judges in
these tribunals were selected by chieftains, and “functioned more like
124
our juries.”
Closer to home, Professor Andrea McDowell provides a
compelling account of customary adjudication involving gold miners
in the early days of the California gold rush. The miners used a
125
number of more-or-less informal dispute-resolution systems. This is
excellent evidence of customary adjudication in action. But Professor
McDowell is primarily interested in how the camps maintained order
126
on the basis of rules that differed greatly from camp to camp, not
how disputes over those rules were resolved. She applies game theory
to show that rules do not need normative value to be effective, but
127
need only sort the rights of disputants before things get nasty. So
although she provides examples of dispute resolution without courts,
customary adjudication is not her focus.
Finally, it is worth noting that scholars operating within the
framework of legal anthropology—some of them on law faculties,
many of them not—have devoted some attention to the forms and
functions of informal adjudication. Professor William Felstiner, for

123. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and
International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 284–90 (2011) (describing medieval Iceland’s court
system (citing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND
SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990); and JESSE L. BYOCK, MEDIEVAL ICELAND: SOCIETY,
SAGAS, AND POWER (1988))).
124. Id. at 285.
125. See Andrea McDowell, Real Property, Spontaneous Order, and Norms in the Gold
Mines, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771, 779 (2004) (“Many mining codes established a procedure
for settling disputes over claims either by arbitration, by an elected official, or by a jury. In some
camps, conflicts were settled by a miners’ meeting—that is, by an assembly of all the miners in
the camp—or at least as many as were willing to come.” (citation omitted)) .
126. See id. at 774 (“I argue that the rules were virtually self-enforcing even though they
varied in detail from camp to camp and sometimes from one day to the next.”).
127. See id. at 801 (“In short, the theory of spontaneous order fits the evidence from the
mines very well.”). To be sure, Professor McDowell argues that the miners were governed by
law rather than norms. See id. at 807 (“It is part of my argument that mining codes, or rules and
regulations, represented law rather than norms or custom.”); id. at 772 (“I argue that the mining
codes were rules, not norms, . . . and that informal controls played little or no role in
maintaining order.”).
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example, forty years ago noted that “[i]nstitutionalized responses to
interpersonal conflict . . . stretch from song duels and witchcraft to
moots and mediation to self-conscious therapy and hierarchical,
128
professionalized courts.” Professor Richard Abel, writing around
the same time as Professor Felstiner, offered a “macrosocial theory to
explain, in terms of social structural variables,” the types of “dispute
129
institutions” in society. Others, operating in a more directly
anthropological vein, have studied the inner workings of dispute130
resolution systems in various communities.
Some law-and-economics scholars have picked up on these
contributions, and indeed they seem to have informed the
sociological-anthropological style of the Ellicksonian approach. One
early and particularly notable foray in this regard was made by
Professor William Landes and Professor, now Judge, Richard Posner,
whose Adjudication as a Private Good “examined the question
whether adjudication can be viewed as a private good, i.e., one whose
131
optimal level will be generated in a free market.” Their answer was
132
something of a qualified yes, and the authors even included a brief
133
explanation of adjudication in primitive societies. But their work
has also been criticized for employing a reductive economic approach
134
and an oversimplified division between the public and private.
Perhaps the more relevant concern for present purposes is simply
that such scholarship did not proliferate. Professor Felstiner
bemoaned the fact that “[a]lthough there is an occasional note to the
effect that ‘private informal dispute settlement . . . is significant in
complex
societies’,
the
references
to
non-government
institutionalized adjudication or mediation within the United States
are very sparse except within organizations, within organized

128. Felstiner, supra note 76, at 63.
129. Richard L. Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW &
SOC’Y 217, 221 (1973).
130. E.g., Jesse Berman, The Cuban Popular Tribunals, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1969);
Laura Nader & Duane Metzger, Conflict Resolution in Two Mexican Communities, 65 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 584 (1963); David N. Smith, Native Courts of North Nigeria: Techniques for
Institutional Development, 48 B.U. L. REV. 49 (1968).
131. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235, 284 (1979).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 242–45.
134. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Adjudication as a Private Good: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 303, 305–08 (1979) (“[A]n economic model which supposes private and public
adjudication as competing in a marketplace is a seriously flawed model.”).
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commercial activities and within some minority groups.” And the
comparative attention given to the judicial function in that
literature—most of it now decades-old—does not seem to have
carried over to the current scholarship on custom and law.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has described customary adjudication and argued that
custom-and-law scholarship has generally undervalued it. Even if that
premise is correct, however, many important questions remain. Much
more must be said about when customary adjudication is likely to
displace formal adjudication and what factors—frequency of disputes,
the stakes at issue, the breadth of agreement on customary rules—are
relevant. That descriptive account would in turn enable a more
thoughtful analysis of when customary adjudication is likely to be
efficient or otherwise normatively desirable. It would also help shed
light on the who of customary adjudication: the people or institutions
actually tasked with resolving disputes. Those research questions
almost certainly require study of a particular system of customary
adjudication—the kind of in-depth, detailed study that has proven so
136
useful in the Ellicksonian-style custom-and-law literature.
These are important questions, and their answers are not
obvious. If customary adjudication does not exist, why not? If custom
creates clear rules to minimize the need for adjudication, that may
help explain both the content and desirability of custom itself. If
customary adjudication is fragile and tends to give way to formal
adjudication, under what conditions does that happen? In sum,
making sense of customary governance requires us to identify and
explain its third branch. This Essay builds on prior scholarship in an
effort to start doing that.

135. Felstiner, supra note 76, at 85 (citation omitted) (quoting Grossman & Sarat).
136. See, e.g., supra notes 67–72 and sources cited therein.

